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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, high levels of military expenditures have characterized 
the budgetary structures of most Middle Eastern countries.1 The basic 
patterns are well known, and for obvious reasons there has been an 
on-going interest among analysts (a) to explain the militarization of the 
region as a whole and (b) to search for variables to explain the level of 
defence spending of the major countries. This latter thrust has focused 
on factors such as economic conditions, population, size of the country, 
rivalries, and arms races. 
Here, conventional wisdom stresses regional arms races as the prime 
culprit in accounting for the staggering military burdens, particularly 
those accrued by Israel, Egypt and Syria. Unfortunately, most of this 
analysis in this area has been anecdotal at best. In addition, many of 
the empirical studies of the region's militarization are based on models 
built largely on arbitrary and often unrealistic assumptions concerning 
the action/reaction patterns of the major participants.2 · 
The purpose of this paper is to identify from a quantitative perspective 
the existence of and causation involved in the region's major arms races. 
To avoid preconceived perceptions and/or biases, the approach is purely 
atheoretical, and is based on several new statistical developments in the 
analysis of causation. 
DETERMINANTS OF DEFENCE SPENDING 
A number of studies have attempted to isolate the factors mainly 
responsible for militarization in the Third World. The most compre-
hensive of this is the analysis undertaken by O'Leary3 and Coplin. 4 
They identified seven factors as accounting one way or another for the 
observed patterns of military expenditures: economic conditions in the 
country, the role of the military in non-military affairs, internal security 
needs, reactions to arms purchases by neighbours, budget allocation to 
service branches in rival states, internal political support, and the age and 
condition of existing military equipmeQt. 
The only apparent correlation was between the military budget and 
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arms races and the budget levels in rival states. Apparently, both these 
factors acted as a 'reference point' from which individual countries might 
set their own budget levels. 
Along similar lines, Hill employed a sample of both developed and 
developing nations in his attempt to synthesize the various approaches 
used to examine the determinants of defence spending. 5 Hill was unable 
to find one 'overriding' factor which could explain a large proportion of 
the variance of defence spending patterns among the sample set. This led 
him to conclude that 'the military spending level of any nation is likely to 
be a product of a number of separate forces', 6 these include arms races, 
military alliances, status and rank discrepancies in international systems, 
military aid, size and wealth of the country, the form of government, 
the extent of military involvement, internal social friction, and internal 
political conflict. 
The purpose of Westing's paper was 'to present some critical reflec-
tions that might prove useful to those concerned with military expen-
ditures and proposals for their reductions' .7 In his analysis, he found 
significant correlations between military expenditures for 159 nations 
and their respective GNP levels, productive land area, and population. 
In an important paper which related defence spending to economic 
variables, Ames and Goff examined defence and education expenditures 
in 16 South American countries for the 20 year period between 1948 
and 1968. 8 They found that political variables were not the major 
determinants of either education or defence budgets; instead, they 
concluded that changes in the education and defence budgets were 
related to the level of available resources. 
More recently, Maizels and Nissanke examined military spending data 
for 83 countries.9 They hypothesized that the three main determinants 
of defence spending are the political framework, military activity, and 
economic linkages. The relative importance of each factor is in turn 
influenced by national, regional or global conflicts or interactions in the 
individual country. Using multiple regression analysis, they concluded 
that: 
Domestic factors, particularly the need perceived by ruling elites to 
repress internal opposition groups, and external factors, including 
relations with the global power blocs and the availability of 
foreign exchange to purchase arms from abroad, also appear 
to be major determinants of government decisions in regard to 
military expenditures.10 
In 1986, Harris attempted to measure the effect of military expen-
ditures from domestic economic conditions. In doing so, he examined 
the budgets (since the early 1960s) in five ASEAN countries: Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.11 His main findings 
were: 
1. Defence expenditures in the current year are positively correlated 
with defence spending and the central budgetary position in the 
previous year. 
2. Current defence expenditures have a ~eak inverse correlation with 
inflation the previous year. 
3. Although current defence budgets are not correlated with the 
balance of payments in the previous year, the balance of payments 
affects government revenue which in turn affects defence spend-
ing.12 
In an extension of the Harris paper, Looney and Frederiksen 
examined the economic determinants of defence expenditures in 
Latin America. Ten countries were examined using time series data: 
Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador.13 Four alternative models were 
tested. The independent variables were current and lagged values 
of GNP, government expenditure, and military expenditures. It was 
found that 'a large proportion of variability in defence expenditures 
can be explained by economic variables; the overall constraint (GDP) 
and fiscal funding variables . . . '14 
In extending Harris's work on the ASEAN countries, Looney and 
Frederiksen found three basic patterns: stabilization (Singapore), aug-
mentation (Malaysia), and distributed lags (Philippines). All countries 
increased defence budgets as expected GNP increased. There were, 
however, significant variations between countries as to the timing of 
increased defence allocations. Specifically, Thailand exhibited a weak 
stabilization pattern. Korean defence expenditure patterns followed a 
long-run distributed lag function. In the case of Thailand, there was a 
weak stabilization effect. Indonesia was found to be a special case where 
resource availability was measured by crude oil production. However, 
there was a weak augmentation effect as measured by the expected and 
unexpected rate of inflation. 
Clearly, a good case can be made that in the Third World economic 
variables constrain or at least modify the manner in which defence 
allocations are undertaken. Clearly the slow-down in military expen-
ditures during the last several years can be traced directly to austerity 
programmes in countries such as Syria, Egypt and Israel. Saudi Arabia's 
reduced defence expenditures are also closely related to developments 
in the international oil markets. 
However, in the Middle East factors liUCh as financial assistance from 
the superpowers, together with hydrocarbon revenues, undoubtedly 
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buffer many countries from the economic constraints found in other 
parts of the world. Hence, the analysis below focuses on arms races per 
se. 
Here, our purpose is to identify the patterns of causation between the 
region's major military spenders. In doing so, we hope to contribute to 
the literature in two respects. First, as is well known, causality tests are, 
in general, sensitive to lag lengths. The use of shorter lags than actually 
existed may distort the causal impact of defence expenditures from one 
country on those of another. On the other hand, relatively long lags may 
cause the absence of any causality between defence expenditures and 
economic growth. Few studies have used an 'atheoretical' methodology 
that allows data themselves to select appropriate lag lengths. Following 
Hsiao, ls Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) criterion will be employed 
to select optimum lag lengths for each variable in each equation. 
ALTERNATIVE TESTS FOR CAUSATION 
Several statistical tests are available for addressing the issue at hand. To 
date, the original and most widely used has been the Granger Test.16 
Granger Test 
Granger17 defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-C) Y if Y 
can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean square error, with 
the use of past values of X than without using past X. For example, in 
assessing the relationship (the same basic formulation would also apply 
to the arms race between the countries) between defence and economic 
performance, Granger causality can be specified as: 
p q 
(1) DEFA (t) = c + Sum a (i) DEFA (t-i) + Sum b (j) DEFB (t-j) + u (t) 
i=l j=l 
r s 
(2) DEFB (t) = c + Sum d (i) DEFB (t-1) + Sum e (j) DEFA (t-j) + v (t) 
i=l j=l 
Where: DEFA is a measure of defence expenditures in country A and 
DEFB is the corresponding measure for country B; p, q, r and s are 
lag lengths for each variable in the equation; and u and v are serially 
uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) 
are 'nice' the specified model is estimated by the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method.18 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint 
F-test is commonly used for causal detection. The F-statistic would be 
calculated by: 
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(3) F = (RSS (x) - RSS (u)/(df (x) - df (u) 
RSS (u)/df (u) 
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where RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted 
and unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respec-
tively, the degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner. 
First, unidirectional causality from DEPA to DEFB if the F-test rejects 
the null hypothesis that past values of DEPA in equation (1) are 
insignificantly different from zero and if the F-test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that past values of DEPA in equation (2) are insignificantly 
different from zero. That is, DEPA causes DEFB but DEFB does not 
cause DEPA. Unidirectional causality runs from DEFB to DEPA if the 
reverse is true. Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF A and 
DEFB if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in equations (1) 
and (2). Finally, no causality exists between DEPA and DEFB if both 
null hypotheses cannot be rejected at the conventional significance level. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice 
of lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the 
omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than 
the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags cause estimates to be 
inefficient. 
While one can choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial 
autocorrelation methods, there i,s no a priori reason to assume lag 
lengths equal for all of our sample countries. For example in a 
different context - a study of causation between defence expenditures 
and growth in the Philippines - Frederiksen and LaCivita19 found no 
statistical relationship between growth and defence when both variables 
were entered in the estimating equation with a lag equal to four. When 
the lag length was changed to two periods, however, it was found that 
growth caused defence. Since both lag lengths were chosen arbitrarily, 
one cannot say which is preferred. 
The Hsaio Procedure 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio20 has developed a 
systematic method for choosing lag lengths for each variable in an 
equation. Hsiao's method combines Granger Causality and Akaike's 
final prediction error (FPE) defined as the (asymptotic) mean square 
prediction error, to determine both thit optimum lag for each variable 
and causal relationships. In a paper examining the problems encountered 
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in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten21 found Hsiao's method 
to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other 
systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of auto-
regressive regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, 
the dependent variable is lagged once. In each succeeding regression, 
one more lag on the dependent variable is added. That is we estimate 
M regressions of the form: 
m 
(4) DEF (t) =a+ Sum b (t-1) DEF (t-1) + e (i) 
i=l 
Where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we 
compute the FPE in the following manner: 
(5) FPE (m) = T + m + l 
T-m-1 
ESS (m) IT 
Where T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final 
prediction error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal 
lag length, m*, is the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Once m* 
has been determined, regressions are estimated with the lags on the other 
variable added sequentially in the same manner used to determine m*. 
Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
m• n 
(6) DEFA (t) = a+ Sum b (t-1) DEAF (t-1) + Sum c (t-1) DEFB (t-1) + e (i) 
i=l . i=l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error 
for each regression as: 
FPE (m* ,n) = T + m* + n + 1 
T-m* - n-1 
ESS (m* ,n) I T 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, D* as the lag length which 
produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine 
lag length is equivalent to using a series of F-tests with variable levels of 
significance. 22 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term 
measures the modelling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality 
property that 'balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected 
and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is 
selected'.23 As noted by Judge et al.,24 an intuitive reason for using the 
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FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term but decrease the 
RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing forces are balanced 
optimally when their product reaches its minimum. 
Again using the example of defence expenditures in country A and B, 
four cases are possible: 
(a) defence(A) causes defence(B) - occurring when the prediction 
error for defence expenditures in country B is reduced when defence 
expenditures in country A is added to the equation. In addition, when 
defence expenditures in country B are added to the country A defence 
equation, that equation's final prediction error increases; 
(b) defence (B) causes defence (A) - occurring when the prediction 
error of country B's defence equation increases when defence in country 
A's defence is added to the equation, and is reduced when country B's 
defence is added to the regression equation for country A's defence; 
( c) feedback - occurring when the final prediction error decreases 
when defence in country A is added to country B's defence equation, 
and the final prediction error decreases when defence in country B is 
added to country A's defence equation; and 
( d) no relationship occurs when the final prediction error increases 
when defence in A is added to B's defence equation, and also increases 
when defence Bis added to country A's defence equation. 
METHODOLOGY 
The data for military expenditures used to carry out the Hsaio test were 
compiled from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
SIPRI Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament. Two alternative 
measures of defence burden were used: (a) constant price defence 
expenditures and (b) the defence burden, the share of defence in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When consistent price deflators were 
not available the defence expenditure term was specified only in terms 
of the growth of the defence burden. 
Before the tests were performed, one statistical problem needed to 
be addressed. It is widely known that most economic time series are 
non-stationary. As indicated by Judge et al.,25 'stationary is an important 
property as it guarantees that there are no fundamental changes in 
the structure of the process that would render prediction difficult or 
impossible'. In order to remove all possible non-stationarities, real 
defence expenditures and the defence burden were transformed to rates 
of growth. When these transformed series were regressed on a constant 
and time, their coefficients on time ..,;ere insignificantly different from 
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TABLE 1 
MIDDLE EAST ARMS 
RACES: ISRAEL, COUNTRY CAUSALITY TESTS 









Israel/Saudi Arabia (Growth in Defence Expenditures) 
1966-1987 402.62 308.36 
(Arabia-+ Israel) 3 years 3 years 
(+) (+) 
r2 0.366 0.637 
Israel/Saudi Arabia (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1966-1987 373.77 349.99 
(Feedback) 1 year 3 years 
(+) (+) 
r2 0.133 0.387 
Israel/Syria (Growth in Defence Expenditures) 
1955-1987 488.84 517.59 
(Israel-+ Syria) 1 year 1 year 
(+) (-) 
r2 0.162 0.165 
Israel/Syria (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1966-1987 373.77 401.01 
(Israel-+ Syria) 1 year 1 year 
(+) (-) 
r2 0.133 0.152 
Israel/Syria (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1962-1987 329.17 348.65 
(Israel-+Syria) 1 year 1 year 
(+) (-) 
r2 0.118 0.136 
Israel/Egypt (Growth in Defence Expenditures) 
1962-1987 362.96 352.20 
(Feedback) 3 years 1 year 
(+) (-) 




























































MIDDLE EAST ARMS 
ARMS CONTROL 
RACES: SAUDI ARABIA, COUNTRY CAUSALITY TESTS 









Saudi Arabia/Iran (Growth in Defence Expenditures) 
1966-1985 712.22 701.31 
(Iran-+ Arabia) 3 years 1 year 
(+) (+) 
r2 0.291 0.372 
Saudi Arabia/Jordan (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1966-1987 618.99 671.63 
( Arabia--+Jordan) 4 years 3 years 
(-) (+) 
r2 0.466 0.570 
Saudi Arabia/Egypt (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1966-1987 618.99 601.51 
(Feedback) 4 years 2 years 
(-) (+) 
r2 0.466 0.574 
Saudi Arabia/Syria (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1966-1987 618.99 510.24 
(Syria-+ Arabia) 3 years 2 years 
(-) . (+) 





































zero for all countries. Similar regressions of the untransformed levels 
indicated the presence of a trend. 
The results for the causality analysis of the regional arms races 
together with the direction of country causation are presented with 
the final prediction error (FPE), the coefficient of determination (r2), 
together with the optimal lag. For simple organizational convenience the 
results are presented in terms of: 
(a) Arms races involving Israel (Table 1); 
(b) those involving Saudi Arabia (but not Israel-Table 2); and 
(c) other regional arms races (Table 3). 
It should be noted that if a country is not listed it is because no 
statistically significant military expenditure patterns were found vis a 
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TABLE3 
MIDDLE EAST ARMS 
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RACES: SYRIA, ALGERIA COUNTRY CAUSALITY TESTS 









Syria/Turkey (Growth in Defence Burden) 
1962-1986 492.36 516.44 
(Syria-. Turkey) 1 year 1 year 
(-) (-) 
r2 0.121 0.150 
Syria/Egypt (Growth in Defence Expenditures) 
1962-1987 667.50 618.96 
(Egypt-.Syria) 1 year 2 years 
(+) (+) 
r2 0.001 0.206 
_·1, 
Dependent Var Algeria Def Algeria Def 
Independent Var Algeria Def Other Def 
Optimum Lag 
Sign () 
Algeria/Morocco (Growth in Military Expenditures) 
1967-1986 554.11 576.99 
(Algeria-.Morocco) 1 year 1 year 
(+) (+) 
r2 0.002 0.052 
Algeria/Morocco (Growth in Military Burden) 
1967-1986 562.44 627.86 
(Algeria-.Morocco) 1 year 1 year 
(-) (+) 
r2 0.003 0.043 












































vis its neighbours. For example, military expenditures in Libya do not 
cause or are not affected by those in Israel or neighbouring North 
African countries. 
The causality analysis produced several interesting findings, the most 
significant of which relate to Israel (Table 1): 
1. Not surprisingly, Israel interacts militarily with by far the greatest 
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number of countries in the region. However, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, Israel appears to initiate many of the regional arms 
races. 
2. Defence expenditures in Israel stimulate (with a one year lag) those 
in Syria. Syrian defence expenditures do not appear to affect Israeli 
decisions concerning allocations to the military. 
3. Increases in Israeli defence expenditures cause Egypt to increase 
(with a three year lag) its defence expenditures. However, increases 
in Egyptian allocations to the military actually cause a decline in 
Israeli defence expenditures. 
4. Israel and Saudi Arabia appear engaged in a mini-arms race, with 
increases in the defence burden in each country responded to (with 
a three year lag) by an increase in that of the other. 
Again, contrary to conventional wisdom, Saudi Arabian defence 
expenditures are not passive adjustments to changes in defence allo-
cations in neighbouring countries. In addition to its arms race with 
Israel, Saudi Arabian defence expenditures interact with those in Egypt. 
Several other patterns are also in evidence (Table 2): 
1. While not affected by Iraqi defence expenditures, Saudi Arabian 
defence expenditures respond to those in Iran (but not vice versa). 
2. Defence expenditures in Jordan are affected by Saudi allocations to 
the military (but not vice versa). 
3. Increases in Syrian defence burdens also stimulate (but not vice 
versa) adjustments upward in the Saudi defence burden. 
4. Interestingly enough, in addition to Saudi Arabia, Iraq's defence 
expenditures do not appear t,0 be caused by, or to affect, those 
of its neighbours. 
Perhaps the most complex patterns involve Syria and its neighbours 
(Table 3): 
1. In addition to affecting allocations to defence in Saudi Arabia, 
increases in Syrian defence expenditures produce a similar response 
in Turkey. 
2. While increases in Israeli defence expenditures produce a similar 
adjustment in Syria, those in Egypt do the same, but with a much 
shorter lag. 
The only other major pattern in the region involves Algeria and 
Morocco, with Algerian defence expenditures affecting Moroccan mili-
tary expenditures with a two or four year lag depending on whether one 
looks at the growth in the defence burden or in military expenditures. 
I 
ARMS RACES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 189 
CONCLUSIONS 
The findings presented above represent a first step in identifying 
the causal interactions between the major Middle East combatants. 
Additional work should be undertaken to control for factors other than 
arms races per se. In this regard, there is always the possibility that 
defence expenditures in say, Jordan or Egypt (which receive economic 
assistance from Saudi Arabia) may simply reflect Saudi oil revenues and 
not Saudi defence expenditures. On the other hand, it is unlikely these 
considerations would alter the main finding of the study: suppressing 
increases in Israeli defence expenditures is the most effective way of 
reducing militarization in the region. 
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